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Abstract: The high pay packages of U.S. CEOs have raised serious concerns about what 
would constitute a fair pay. Since the present economic models do not adequately address 
this fundamental question, we propose a new theory based on statistical mechanics and 
information theory. We use the principle of maximum entropy to show that the maximally 
fair pay distribution is lognormal under ideal conditions. This prediction is in agreement with 
observed data for the bottom 90%–95% of the working population. The theory estimates 
that the top 35 U.S. CEOs were overpaid by about 129 times their ideal salaries in 2008. 
We also provide an insight of entropy as a measure of fairness, which is maximized at 
equilibrium, in an economic system.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been great concern over the high pay packages awarded to the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) of U.S. corporations. The ratio of CEO salary (i.e., total compensation 
including bonuses and stock options) to that of an average employee has gone up from about 25–40 in 
the 1970s to as high as 344 in recent years in the U.S.
 
[1]. Compared with minimum wage, the ratio has 
risen from about 50 in 1965 to about 866 in 2007
 
[1,2]. However, the ratio has remained around 20–40 
in Europe and 10–15 in Japan [3]. 
OPEN ACCESS 
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All these comparisons, naturally, raise the question of ―What is the fair pay for a CEO relative to 
other employees?‖ which we try to address in this paper. Clearly, corporate boards and compensation 
committees seem to think that CEOs deserve such high pay as they are the ones who approve the pay 
packages. But how does a board arrive at this decision? On what scientific basis does the board make its 
assessment and decision? Is this a rational, unbiased decision? These concerns lead to an important 
fundamental question: Is there a rational quantitative framework for evaluating a CEO‘s value in  
a corporation?  
The usual response to these questions, of course, is that the free market takes care of all this and 
determines the value of a CEO and the other employees. If an employee feels that his or her pay 
package is low and unfair, he or she will shop around in the market until he or she receives a fair offer 
and will move to another organization, subject to constraints such as geographical preferences, career 
growth opportunities, impact on family, etc. Is the market really efficient in determining these fair 
values? For markets to be efficient there needs to be free and unfettered flow of voluminous  
information–information about job openings, compensation packages, growth opportunities, skill sets, 
etc.–and a very large number of potential candidates who are available to trade jobs.  
One can reasonably expect the lower to middle level of the compensation spectrum, e.g., from 
secretaries to engineers to middle level management professionals, to arrive at a fair wage distribution 
through an iterative, market-driven, feedback process as there is free and unfettered flow of large 
amounts of information, and large number of candidates, at these levels. However, it is doubtful that 
such a distribution is achieved at the very top end of the compensation spectrum as it is a thinly traded 
market. Further, the details of the pay packages or the process of recruiting candidates are often not 
very transparent. In their persuasive work, Bebchuk and Fried
 
[4]
 describe how the ―arm‘s-length 
contracting‖ model of executive compensation has broken down, and provide several reasons for this 
systemic failure. Under such conditions, it should not be surprising that the free market may not 
function as freely and efficiently as it could at the top end of the pay spectrum. The net result could be 
over compensation of CEOs and the upper management. But does this happen? If so, how much is this 
over compensation? Is there a quantitative framework for estimating this?  
2. Towards a Rational Quantitative Framework for Determining Relative Value of Employees 
Now let us examine a couple of compensation scenarios. Consider a computer company that is 
successful with a number of products and services. All the employees contribute to its overall success in 
their own ways. The cleaning crew keeps the premises neat, secretarial staff help with organization and 
communication, engineers develop products and services, marketing and sales personnel bring new 
orders, accounting and finance department minds the books, management focuses on a winning 
corporate strategy and execution, and so on. Different people contribute in different ways to the 
company‘s overall success. How do we value each one‘s contribution and reward them suitably? While 
it is clear that they all contribute, are they all contributing equally? Are some employees contributing 
more than others? Are some employees more valuable than others? Are some skill sets and experiences 
more important than others?  
In scenario one, let us say that the company‘s compensation committee has an egalitarian philosophy, 
values all employees as identically equal, and pays them equally. Everybody in the company, right from 
Entropy 2009, 11              
 
 
768 
the CEO to the cleaning crew member, gets the same salary. While this may sound wonderful in a social 
justice sense, is this really a fair distribution of the company‘s profits? In doing so, one makes a very 
important assumption that every one is contributing equally to the overall success of the company. Is 
this a correct assumption? This assumption implies that the contribution made by the cleaning crew 
member is exactly equal to that made by the chief architect of the company‘s successful VLSI chip. This 
further implies that if the chief architect were to quit tomorrow its effect on the company‘s prospects 
would be the same as the cleaning crew member not showing up for work. Obviously, they are not the 
same. While they both contribute, they ought to be valued differently. Otherwise, disenchanted 
employees will leave and there will be no company left, despite its noble intentions.  
Let us now consider the other extreme. Only the CEO is considered to be most valuable, and 
everyone else is of minimal value. The CEO gets most of the profits as his or her pay and the rest are 
paid negligible amounts. Obviously, employees will flee the company in droves and soon there will be 
no company left.  
Clearly, the reality is somewhere in between these two extremes of valuation schemes. But where? 
What is a maximally fair assessment of relative value and the concomitant distribution of profits among 
the employees?  
In the first scenario, even though it may seem like an unbiased assessment, unbiased in the social 
justice sense (i.e., ―all human beings are equal‖), it is an extremely biased position in the economic 
sense. From the perspective of economic productivity contributed by different employees, not everyone 
is equal in importance in their contributions towards the final products and services. Thus, it is unfair to 
assume that all should be valued equally in their contributions. Similarly, the other case, is also 
extremely biased to think that only the CEO made everything happen.  
Thus, the question of what is a maximally fair assessment of relative values of employees reduces to 
the following: What is the distribution of wages or profits that avoids such biases and assumptions? In 
other words, what is the least biased distribution of attributing value? Since pay packages reflect the 
perceived values of the employees, one can use pay as a proxy for value. So, the question then is what is 
the least biased distribution of pay?  
In a competitive free market environment, companies and employees as rational agents arrive at this 
distribution iteratively, by a trial-and-error evolutionary feedback process, through the free exchange of 
information and people between companies and the market environment, until equilibrium is reached. 
The survival instinct drives people to maximize their values and trade their current jobs for more 
rewarding ones. Companies also do the same by hiring and firing employees in order to derive better 
value from them and maximize profits. Therefore, the least biased distribution of relative value is 
reached in practice via such a market process, empirically. That is, the equilibrium distribution is 
―discovered‖ through such evolutionary adaptation.  
We now ask the following question: instead of the empirical discovery approach, can we design the 
least biased distribution a priori? That is, can we predict theoretically what this distribution ought to be 
at equilibrium? Is there a quantitative framework that could help us address this fundamental question? 
Such a framework, even if it were limited to ideal conditions, would still be quite valuable as a reference 
model with respect to which reality may be compared. Such a model would provide us useful 
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quantitative metrics which measure the deviation from ideality. It would help us understand and quantify 
how rational and efficient the market is in discovering this distribution in practice.  
At present, there appears to be no such predictive, rational, quantitative framework along the lines 
discussed above. There is, however, extensive literature on the executive pay packages, income 
distributions, etc., but typically from the empirical perspective
 
[5-10]. There appears to be no discussion 
on what a CEO pay package ought to be and why, from a fundamental perspective. Currently, reflecting 
the popular outrage in the U.S. towards executive compensation, there are suggestions being made to 
cap the CEO pay at some arbitrary level (such as 25 times the minimum wage
 
[11]) without any rational 
quantitative analysis justifying why that particular level. Therefore, a rational perspective would be of 
considerable help in many ways.  
It turns out that one can indeed develop such a theory, and somewhat surprisingly, the answer does 
not come from economics as one might expect, but from the fundamental principles of statistical 
mechanics and information theory.  
3. An Information Theoretic Framework 
Let us address this question from an information theoretic perspective. Our objective here is not to 
develop an exact model of the relative value distribution which is impossible at the present as one does 
not know, and quite possibly may never know, how to measure the value of an individual‘s 
contributions precisely. Our primary objective is to formulate a general theory that can provide a 
rational quantitative framework for a fair assessment of relative values of employees in an organization 
so that we can design a priori the least biased distribution. Our secondary objective is to develop a 
model that is capable explaining and predicting the character of the relative value distribution as 
observed in practice.  
To get started with such a design perspective, let us examine what we know about this distribution a 
priori. There are many things we do not know about this distribution, but we do have some partial 
knowledge. Typically, one (or the compensation committee) does know at least four things: (i) total 
number of employees (N) including the CEO, (ii) total amount of money budgeted (M) to pay all these 
employees, (iii) minimum salary (Smin) received by the lowest employee, often fixed by the minimum 
wage law, and (iv) the maximum salary (Smax) cannot exceed M. This may not seem like much, but even 
this partial knowledge can help us a great deal by narrowing the choices, as we shall show, since the 
value distribution is constrained by this information. In practice, one might have more information but at 
the very least one would possess this data set. 
In order to simplify the analysis, let us consider an ideal situation where one‘s perceived value V in an 
organization is captured entirely by his or her salary S, i.e., V = f(S). Reality, of course, is much more 
complicated than this. Titles, awards, peer recognition, perks, etc. can matter a lot as metrics of value in 
addition to pay. While real life distributions can be distorted by such factors, pay, however, is still the 
dominant factor in recognizing an employee‘s perceived value. We assume S to be continuous.  
While we claim that pay is a reasonable proxy for perceived value, it is, however, not a linear scale. It 
is quite well known that money has diminishing marginal utility as an incentive and that the value of 
money has a saturation behavior. This saturation behavior of money has generally been modeled (e.g., 
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as in St Petersburg Paradox
 
[12]) as a logarithmic function. Further, we can also derive this relationship 
from the observation that since people value money as a proportion, it follows that:  
V = f(S), s.t. dV = dS/f(S)   
which leads to the perceived value Vi of any employee i as:  
Vi = C ln Si (1)  
where Si is his or her total annual salary including bonuses and other benefits, and C is a constant of 
proportionality which we set equal to one. We choose the natural logarithm for  
mathematical convenience.  
Therefore, the central question of ―What is the least biased allocation of values among employees?‖ 
now reduces to the question of ―What is the least biased distribution of M dollars among N employees 
as salaries Si?‖ 
Another useful piece of information we have is the range R of the values, given by:   
R ≡ Vmax – Vmin (2)  
                                   = ln Smax – ln Smin = ln M – ln Smin (3)  
From (3), we can estimate the standard deviation σ of the distribution by using the well known 
Chebychev inequality given by
 
[13-15]:  
P[–aσ < X – θ < aσ] ≥ 1– 1/a2 (4)  
where, θ is the mean of the distribution. By choosing a large enough value for a (e.g., a = 10), one can 
estimate σ as R/2a with as much confidence as one desires (e.g., for a = 10, P ≥ 0.99). As we shall see, 
the actual value of a is not important for our purposes. Thus, we now know one more thing about this 
distribution, an estimate of its σ. Of course, we realize that this is an overestimate since the upper bound 
M for salary is usually not the case. In practice, one would have a much more realistic upper bound. 
Fortunately, as we shall see, this does not affect our main conclusions.  
Now, we can also estimate the mean or the expected value E[V]:  
E[V] = E[ln S] (5)  
by using another well known result, namely, Jensen‘s inequality [14,15], given by: 
E[ln S] ≤ ln(E[S]) (6)  
 
          ≤ ln(M/N) (7)  
which gives us an upper bound for the mean: 
E[ln S] = ln(M/N) ≡ μ (8)  
Now that we have gained additional knowledge about this distribution, let us analyze the model 
derived from these upper bounds. Our central question has thus been reduced to: “What is the least 
biased distribution of M dollars among N employees given the constraints E[lnS] = μ and  
E[(lnS)
2
] = σ2 ?” 
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This question can be answered by applying the Principle of Maximum Entropy (PME) from 
information theory
 
[16-18]. Principle of Maximum Entropy states that given some partial information 
about a random variate S, of all the distributions that are consistent with the given information, the least 
biased distribution is the one that has the maximum entropy associated with it. Thus, the maximum 
entropy distribution does not make any unwarranted assumptions or biases about individual values that 
are not explicitly specified a priori as constraints.  
Following Shannon‘s definition of entropy, and applying PME under the above specified constraints 
using the method of Lagrange multipliers, it is easy to show
 
[19,20] that the least biased distribution is 
lognormal, given by the probability density function:  
2
2
2
)(ln
2
1
), f(S; 






S
e
S
 (9)  
with the mean: 
2
2
1
][

 eSE  (10)  
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The entropy H of this distribution is given by: 
H( )2ln(
2
1
), 2 e  (12)  
Thus, the lognormal distribution of salaries is the least biased, maximally fair, way of distributing 
pay in an organization under ideal conditions.  
It is also easily seen that the distribution of lnS follows a normal distribution with the mean μ and 
variance σ2. In other words, the maximally fair distribution salaries is lognormal while that of values  
is normal.  
We do realize that our estimates of mean and standard deviation are upper bounds and that the true 
mean μ* and standard deviation σ* of the population will be lower. Let us assume, for the sake of 
argument, that through additional information we are provided a better estimate of the mean (= μ )´ and 
standard deviation (= σ )´ which are a lot closer to the true values. Under these conditions, the PME 
would still yield a lognormal distribution, but with a different mean (μ )´ and standard deviation (σ )´. 
Thus, the crucial insight here is that even if our guesses about the mean and standard deviation are not 
very good, the essential qualitative character of the distribution does not change and remains 
lognormal – only the parameters such as the mean and standard deviation change. Further more, it turns 
out that our initial estimate for the mean as μ is not too bad. Since the resulting distribution turned out 
to be lognormal, the approximation of: 
E[lnS] = ln[E(S)] (13)  
is actually quite good.  
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How does this prediction compare with reality? The pay or wage distribution data for individual 
companies are generally not available and are often regarded as proprietary information. However, one 
can compare with aggregate data reported in the literature gathered from income tax filings for millions 
of people. For large corporations that employ tens of thousands of people (e.g., Fortune  
500 companies), it is reasonable to expect the essential character of the pay distribution for such 
corporations to be quite close to that of the population data. The mean and variance might differ but it 
is reasonable to expect the essential qualitative nature to remain the same.  
Our prediction of a lognormal distribution is in good agreement with the population data
 
[5-10, 24] 
for the bottom part of the spectrum. It‘s been reported that typically the bottom 90%–95% of the 
income distribution follows the lognormal distribution while the top 5%–10% follows a Pareto, or 
power law, distribution. As noted earlier, these are ―discovered‖ empirically in practice through the 
iterative free market-driven process. Again, we expect the market to be functioning freely and efficiently 
for the lower and the middle parts of the distribution. Hence, it is not surprising that the maximally fair 
distribution is enforced by the market forces for those employees. However, it is still quite remarkable 
that our prediction fits the observed data for a very high percentage (~90%–95%) of the population, 
even though our model was developed under idealized assumptions thereby potentially limiting its  
real-world applicability. It is also very encouraging to see that in practice a great majority of the 
employees are being treated fairly.  
Regarding the top 5%–10%, the situation is more complicated as the aggregate income data is 
confounded by a combination of both wage and investment incomes
 
[21-25]. One needs wage only data 
from companies to test the model for this end of the spectrum conclusively. At this juncture, it is 
important to differentiate between the results reported in the literature on income distributions from 
wealth distributions. Even though both seem to have similar structures, namely, a lognormal body with a 
Pareto tail
 
[21-25], our focus in this paper is on wage distribution. We believe the proposed framework 
could be applied to the study of wealth distributions as well since one‘s wage income is the first step 
towards accumulating wealth, and therefore, patterns in wage income generation could lead to similar 
patterns in wealth creation. However, since wealth creation also includes returns (including 
appreciation) from investments, the underlying economic mechanisms for wealth creation are different 
from wage distribution ones.  
Others have proposed thermodynamically inspired models for the emergence of income and wealth 
distributions
 
[21-33]. Our contribution, however, takes a different perspective, namely, an information 
theoretic one, and asks a very different question, namely, ―What is the maximally fair distribution of 
wages among employees?‖, even though our methodology, too, draws on concepts from 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.  
As others have shown
 
[21-31], the bottom 90%–95% of the income data seem to fit both lognormal 
and Gibbs-Boltzmann distributions. Economists seem to favor the lognormal distribution while 
econophysicists prefer the Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution
 
[24,27]. Our theory suggests that the 
lognormal distribution is perhaps the right candidate and offers justification based on fundamental 
principles which was lacking in the earlier studies. Furthermore, it captures the essential concepts of 
economics such as value, fairness, and marginal utility of money, which are missing in the purely 
thermodynamic formalisms
 
that have been proposed before
 
[26,32,33]. 
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4. What is Fair Pay for CEOs? 
This analysis has important implications for designing fair pay packages for the top management  
(top 5%–10%) including the CEO. Under the ideal conditions discussed above, the top management‘s 
pay also should fall in line with the rest of the employees wages on a lognormal distribution. Otherwise, 
we are treating the rest of the company unfairly by over paying for the services of the top management. 
Further, the company is also wasting substantial resources by over compensating the senior 
management
 
[4]. Then there is also the risk of creating poor morale among the vast majority of the 
employees
 
[4,34].  
So, how would a compensation committee go about determining a fair pay structure for the top 
management? The obvious procedure would be is to best fit the salary data to a lognormal distribution 
for the bottom 90%–95% of the employees and determine its mean and variance. This is the distribution 
that the rest of the data (i.e., top 5%–10%) ought to follow, so that the entire population of employees 
is treated fairly on the same basis. The CEO‘s salary can be determined directly from this extrapolated 
lognormal distribution plot or by calculating the standard deviation for the CEO‘s data position (σCEO) on 
the bell curve and computing the corresponding salary for it. Adjustments to this ideal pay package can 
be made as needed, to account for individual talents and accomplishments, by relating them to both 
short term and long term performance targets. 
Since the salary distribution data for companies are not available, we present as an example (Tables 1 
and 2) a number of plausible salary scenarios, and estimate what a fair pay for a CEO ought to be for 
the top CEOs whose 2008 pay packages were published by the New York Times recently
 
[35]. We 
consider 35 companies from the top 50 for which reliable employee data were available from various 
websites. Since lnS follows a normal distribution, we perform our calculations using the standard 
normal distribution tables which make the calculations easier. In our calculations, we assume that: 
ln (mean salary) – ln (minimum salary) = 3σ (14) 
From this we estimate σ and calculate the CEO salary by computing the corresponding σCEO upper 
bound for which the outside area under the bell curve (i.e. under the far right tail) equals 1/N, where N 
is the total number of employees in the company. For example, for Motorola which has  
about 64,000 employees, 1/64000 = 0.0000156 corresponds to a position on the bell curve that is 4.16 
standard deviation (i.e., σCEO = 4.16σ) away to the right of the mean, thereby fixing the ideal CEO salary. 
We emphasize that these are only rough estimates, as we lack detailed salary distribution data which are 
needed to estimate the μ, σ, and σCEO more accurately. Once we have the actual pay distribution, one can 
apply much more rigorous statistical methodologies to better estimate these parameters and the  
CEO‘s pay.  
Nevertheless, even these rough estimates are quite illuminating. We consider two cases: (i) in  
Table 1, the minimum salary is taken to be the minimum wage of $6.55/hr or $13,100/year assuming  
a 2,000 work hours/yr basis; (ii) in Table 2, minimum salary is set equal to $25,000/yr, which is perhaps 
more typical in many corporations. For each of these cases, we consider several mean annual salary 
scenarios: $40K, $60K, $80K, and $100K. The CEO pay ratios are computed by dividing the actual, 
and the ideal, annual CEO pay by the minimum annual salary.  
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Minimum salary = $13100
Company CEO's Total Pay Total Employees (N) Outside Area (1/N) CEO Sigma Actual CEO Ideal Ideal Ideal Ideal
Incl salary+bonus estimates from from  Normal Distrn  Estimate Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio
in $millions various websites Z-tables From Z-Tables Mean Salary=$40K Mean Salary=$60K Mean Salary=$80K Mean Salary=$100K
2008 2008 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Motorola 104.4 64000 0.00001563 4.16 7969 14.3 37.7 74.9 127.5
Oracle 84.6 50000 0.00002000 4.11 6458 14.1 36.7 72.6 123.1
Walt Disney 51.1 150000 0.00000667 4.35 3901 15.4 41.6 84.2 145.4
American Express 42.8 30162 0.00003315 3.99 3267 13.5 34.6 67.6 113.7
Citi Group 38.2 324850 0.00000308 4.52 2916 16.4 45.2 93.0 162.7
Hewlett Packard 34.0 321000 0.00000312 4.52 2595 16.4 45.2 93.0 162.7
News Corp 30.1 53000 0.00001887 4.12 2298 14.1 36.9 73.1 124.1
Honeywell 28.7 128000 0.00000781 4.32 2191 15.2 40.9 82.5 142.1
Proctor & Gamble 25.6 138000 0.00000725 4.34 1954 15.3 41.3 83.5 144.0
Abbott 25.1 68697 0.00001456 4.18 1916 14.4 38.1 75.8 129.3
Lockheed Martin 22.9 146000 0.00000685 4.35 1748 15.4 41.5 84.0 145.0
eBay 22.5 7769 0.00012872 3.65 1718 11.9 29.1 55.1 90.3
Anadarko Petroleum 22.2 4000 0.00025000 3.48 1695 11.1 26.7 49.7 80.5
United Technologies 22.0 223100 0.00000448 4.44 1679 15.9 43.5 88.6 154.1
Bristol Myers Squibb 21.8 42000 0.00002381 4.07 1664 13.9 36.0 70.9 120.0
Hess 21.3 13300 0.00007519 3.79 1626 12.5 31.3 59.9 99.3
Johnson & Johnson 21.1 118700 0.00000842 4.30 1611 15.1 40.5 81.5 140.2
IBM 21.0 398455 0.00000251 4.57 1603 16.7 46.4 95.9 168.3
Verizon 19.9 234971 0.00000426 4.45 1519 16.0 43.7 89.2 155.2
Coca Cola 19.6 90500 0.00001105 4.24 1496 14.8 39.3 78.6 134.6
Avon 19.5 42000 0.00002381 4.07 1489 13.9 36.0 70.9 120.0
Cisco 18.8 32160 0.00003109 4.01 1435 13.6 34.9 68.4 115.2
Qualcomm 18.6 11932 0.00008381 3.76 1420 12.4 30.8 58.8 97.3
General Dynamics 18.0 83500 0.00001198 4.22 1374 14.7 38.9 77.6 132.8
CVS 17.4 160000 0.00000625 4.37 1328 15.5 41.9 85.0 147.0
Merck 17.3 58900 0.00001698 4.15 1321 14.3 37.5 74.4 126.7
Prudential 16.3 49616 0.00002015 4.11 1244 14.1 36.8 72.7 123.3
Deere 16.2 52022 0.00001922 4.12 1237 14.1 36.9 73.1 124.1
AT&T 15.0 302660 0.00000330 4.51 1145 16.3 45.0 92.5 161.6
ADM 15.0 27600 0.00003623 3.97 1145 13.4 34.2 66.8 112.1
Pepsi 14.9 198000 0.00000505 4.41 1137 15.7 42.8 87.1 151.0
Johnson Comtrols 14.9 140000 0.00000714 4.34 1137 15.3 41.3 83.5 144.0
Pfizer 14.8 86600 0.00001155 4.22 1130 14.7 38.9 77.6 132.8
Boeing 14.8 162200 0.00000617 4.37 1130 15.5 41.9 85.0 147.0
Burlington 14.6 40000 0.00002500 4.06 1115 13.8 35.8 70.5 119.2
Average 26.4 2017 14.6 38.6 77.1 131.9
Berkshire 0.2 246083 0.00000406 4.46 15 16.0 43.9 89.7 156.2
Table 1. Comparing top CEO salaries with minimum wage: actual vs ideal ratios. 
 
Even in the most optimistic scenario (Table 1: Minimum wage Scenario #4), we see that these CEOs 
have been overpaid considerably. In Table 2, Scenario #2, which is perhaps more close to reality, the 
excesses are very large. On an average, the actual CEO pay ratio is 1,057 while the ideal value is  
about 8.2 – i.e., about 129 times the ideal value. In 2008, S&P 500 CEOs averaged about $10.0 million, 
with an average CEO pay ratio of about 400 (on the $25,000/year minimum salary basis) which is  
about 50 times the ideal value.  
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Minimum salary = $25000
Company CEO's Total Pay Total Employees (N) Outside Area (1/N) CEO Sigma Actual CEO Ideal Ideal Ideal Ideal
Incl salary+bonus estimates from from  Normal Distrn  Estimate Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio CEO Pay Ratio
in $millions various websites Z-tables From Z-Tables Mean Salary=$40K Mean Salary=$60K Mean Salary=$80K Mean Salary=$100K
2008 2008 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Motorola 104.4 64000 0.00001563 4.16 4176 3.1 8.1 16.0 27.3
Oracle 84.6 50000 0.00002000 4.11 3384 3.0 7.9 15.7 26.6
Walt Disney 51.1 150000 0.00000667 4.35 2044 3.2 8.5 17.3 29.9
American Express 42.8 30162 0.00003315 3.99 1712 3.0 7.7 15.0 25.2
Citi Group 38.2 324850 0.00000308 4.52 1528 3.2 9.0 18.4 32.2
Hewlett Packard 34.0 321000 0.00000312 4.52 1360 3.2 9.0 18.4 32.2
News Corp 30.1 53000 0.00001887 4.12 1204 3.0 8.0 15.8 26.8
Honeywell 28.7 128000 0.00000781 4.32 1148 3.1 8.5 17.1 29.4
Proctor & Gamble 25.6 138000 0.00000725 4.34 1024 3.2 8.5 17.2 29.7
Abbott 25.1 68697 0.00001456 4.18 1004 3.1 8.1 16.2 27.5
Lockheed Martin 22.9 146000 0.00000685 4.35 916 3.2 8.5 17.3 29.8
eBay 22.5 7769 0.00012872 3.65 900 2.8 7.0 13.2 21.6
Anadarko Petroleum 22.2 4000 0.00025000 3.48 888 2.8 6.6 12.3 19.9
United Technologies 22.0 223100 0.00000448 4.44 880 3.2 8.8 17.9 31.1
Bristol Myers Squibb 21.8 42000 0.00002381 4.07 872 3.0 7.9 15.5 26.2
Hess 21.3 13300 0.00007519 3.79 852 2.9 7.2 13.9 23.0
Johnson & Johnson 21.1 118700 0.00000842 4.30 844 3.1 8.4 16.9 29.1
IBM 21.0 398455 0.00000251 4.57 840 3.3 9.1 18.8 33.0
Verizon 19.9 234971 0.00000426 4.45 796 3.2 8.8 17.9 31.2
Coca Cola 19.6 90500 0.00001105 4.24 784 3.1 8.3 16.5 28.3
Avon 19.5 42000 0.00002381 4.07 780 3.0 7.9 15.5 26.2
Cisco 18.8 32160 0.00003109 4.01 752 3.0 7.7 15.1 25.5
Qualcomm 18.6 11932 0.00008381 3.76 744 2.9 7.2 13.7 22.7
General Dynamics 18.0 83500 0.00001198 4.22 720 3.1 8.2 16.4 28.1
CVS 17.4 160000 0.00000625 4.37 696 3.2 8.6 17.4 30.1
Merck 17.3 58900 0.00001698 4.15 692 3.1 8.0 16.0 27.2
Prudential 16.3 49616 0.00002015 4.11 652 3.0 8.0 15.7 26.7
Deere 16.2 52022 0.00001922 4.12 648 3.0 8.0 15.8 26.8
AT&T 15.0 302660 0.00000330 4.51 600 3.2 8.9 18.4 32.1
ADM 15.0 27600 0.00003623 3.97 600 3.0 7.6 14.9 25.0
Pepsi 14.9 198000 0.00000505 4.41 596 3.2 8.7 17.7 30.6
Johnson Comtrols 14.9 140000 0.00000714 4.34 596 3.2 8.5 17.2 29.7
Pfizer 14.8 86600 0.00001155 4.22 592 3.1 8.2 16.4 28.1
Boeing 14.8 162200 0.00000617 4.37 592 3.2 8.6 17.4 30.1
Burlington 14.6 40000 0.00002500 4.06 584 3.0 7.8 15.4 26.1
Average 26.4 1057 3.1 8.2 16.3 27.9
Berkshire 0.2 246083 0.00000406 4.46 8 3.2 8.8 18.0 31.3
Table 2. Comparing top CEO salaries with minimum salary of $25 k/yr: actual vs. ideal ratios. 
 
Obviously, we do expect real-world economic systems to deviate from ideal systems, thus 
necessitating larger pay packages for CEOs. But would they deviate so much that the actual CEO pay 
ratio is 50 to 129 times the ideal benchmark? That‘s hard to believe particularly when for the rest of the 
employees, i.e., for the bottom 90%–95%, their compensation follows the ideal lognormal distribution. 
It appears that the market, which seems to function quite fairly and efficiently for the bottom 90%–95% 
of the employees, does not appear to work as well for the top end of the spectrum. We now have a 
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rational scientific basis for supporting, in fact quantifying, what people have argued for quite sometime 
about executive pay excesses and the breakdown of the efficient market at the top management levels. 
However, further studies along the lines suggested below are needed to understand this non-ideal 
behavior in greater depth. We need to be able to determine, using a rational analytic framework, how 
much excess pay over the ideal limit should be paid to the executives as a function of the non-idealities.  
As a contrast, it is quite interesting to note that Mr. Warren Buffet, the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway 
and an outspoken critic of executive pay excesses, drew a salary of $200K in 2008. This makes his pay 
ratio 8:1 (Table 2), which fits the ideal benchmark estimate (Scenario 2) almost exactly.  
It is also instructive to note that, in 2006, according to The Wall Street Journal
 
[36], the average 
CEO pay ratio was about 11:1 in Japan, 15:1 in France, 20:1 in Canada, and 22:1 in Britain, which are 
not that far off (compared to the U.S. ratios) from the ideal benchmark estimates. As noted in the 
introduction, even in the U.S. the CEO pay ratios were much more reasonable and in general agreement 
with the ideal values, in 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, the executive pay excesses appear to be a recent 
phenomenon in the U.S., perhaps due to the reasons argued by Bebchuk and Fried. This appears to be 
another valuation bubble – the CEO valuation bubble, much like the ones we have witnessed in stocks, 
real estate, commodities, etc. While the emphasis of this section has been on CEO pay, the observations 
made here are applicable for the entire senior management in a corporation.  
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
For about two decades or so, it‘s been observed that the CEOs of U.S. companies are being paid 
rather large pay packages. It seems unfair but is it really unfair? How can one tell? On what basis? 
What, then, would be a fair salary and why?  
We could not answer such questions before, as we lacked a rational quantitative framework. The 
proposed information theoretic framework helps us address these questions and predicts the ideal wage 
distribution to be lognormal, which agrees well with observed data for the bottom 90%–95% of the pay 
distribution. Like the minimum wage law which sets a lower limit, our theory suggests what the 
maximum wage ought to be under ideal conditions. Of course, there are always exceptional individuals 
who may deserve a higher reward. This theory provides a rational basis for setting the fair base pay 
scales for the top management (indeed for everyone in the organization) and any added incentive pay 
package might then be linked to measureable and meaningful performance metrics that promote long 
term survival and growth of the organization. This result also addresses some thorny issues in pay 
compression
 
[34] by identifying the optimal pay compression policy as a lognormal distribution. 
However, further studies are needed to understand these issues much better. 
This theory is not valid for small, highly entrepreneurial, organizations where a handful of employees 
(e.g., the founders of a start-up) are demonstrably much more valuable than the others. But this is not 
the case for many large organizations (e.g., Fortune 500 companies) with tens to hundreds of thousands 
of employees, where the CEO is often another hired hand.  
Though developed under certain simplifying assumptions, the proposed theory could still be useful as 
a framework for designing tax policy, corporate governance, and public policy guidelines. It can be used 
as a starting point to design the ideal, maximally fair, distribution which then can be further adapted and 
tuned to meet real-world constraints. Companies may even use this as a recruiting and retention tool to 
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show how committed they are to a fair treatment of all employees. Shareholders may require companies 
to publish this information in their annual reports and could use it to demand justification for any excess 
pay paid to the top management.  
As noted, simplifying assumptions were made since our objective was to develop a general 
theoretical framework and identify general principles that are not restricted by domain specific details 
and constraints. Clearly, the next steps are to conduct more comprehensive studies of salary 
distributions in various organizations in order to understand in greater detail the deviations from ideality 
in the market place. Agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and National Bureau of Economic 
Research could organize task forces to gather wage data from various companies and organizations. 
The data should be so grouped to analyze wage distribution patterns across several dimensions such as: 
(i) organization size—small, medium, large, and very large number of employees, (ii) different industrial 
sectors, (iii) different types such as private corporations, governments (state and federal), non-profit 
organizations, etc. Similar studies should be conducted in other countries as well so that we can better 
understand global patterns. We would expect the ideal conditions proposed by this theory to be better 
satisfied in non-profit organizations such as universities, charitable foundations, and governmental 
agencies. The applicability of this theory is not limited to pay distribution alone. It is also applicable to 
other situations (e.g. optimal resource allocation) that arise in economics and social sciences regarding 
equality and fairness.  
Our contribution is mainly a conceptual one, resulting from the generalization of the laws of 
statistical thermodynamics to teleological systems, such as economic systems, proposed by this  
author
 
[37]. In this framework, which we call statistical teleodynamics, the first law of thermodynamics 
is generalized to an information theoretic interpretation to yield performance constraints, such as  
E(lnS) = μ and E[(lnS)2] = σ2, which a teleological system must satisfy. As for the second law, 
Shannon and Jaynes liberated entropy from its narrow thermodynamic view to a broader information 
theoretic interpretation as a measure of uncertainty. In our contribution, we propose the use of entropy 
as a measure of fairness [38] in economic systems. Thus, maximizing entropy is the same as maximizing 
fairness collectively in economic systems. Economic equilibrium is reached under this condition when 
the participants feel they have received a maximally fair deal given the constraints. As we all know, 
fairness is a fundamental economic principle that lies at the foundation of the free and efficient market 
system. It is so vital to the proper functioning of the markets that we have regulations and watchdog 
agencies that breakup and punish unfair practices such as monopolies, collusion, and insider trading. 
Thus, it is eminently reasonable, indeed reassuring, to find that maximizing fairness, i.e. maximizing 
entropy, is the condition for achieving economic equilibrium.  
In the past, there have been many attempts to find a suitable interpretation of entropy for economic 
systems without much success
 
[39,40]. In these attempts, one typically wrote down equations in 
economics that mirrored and mapped expressions in thermodynamics for entropy, energy, temperature, 
etc.—but no identification of entropy in terms of meaningful economic concepts was made. Just as 
entropy is a measure of disorder in thermodynamics and uncertainty in information theory, what does 
entropy mean in economics? Neither interpretation, disorder nor uncertainty, makes much sense in the 
economic context. Economic systems work best when they have orderly markets. Why then would 
anyone want to maximize disorder? Similarly, economic systems work best when there is less 
Entropy 2009, 11              
 
 
778 
uncertainty. Why then would anyone want to maximize uncertainty? The inability to address this crucial 
issue has been a major conceptual hurdle for decades in making real progress along this line of enquiry.  
We believe that identifying entropy as a measure of fairness, which is a fundamental economic 
principle, is a significant advancement made by our theory in bridging the gap and showing the intimate 
connection between statistical thermodynamics, information theory, and economics.  
Intuitively, it is now clear that any deviation from the equilibrium wage distribution would result in 
less of a fair deal for the participants overall, and therefore, is not likely to happen—e.g., imagine all 
employees voluntarily accepting lower salaries even though they are offered higher salaries, which is 
unlikely to happen spontaneously. Conceptually, this is similar to molecules in an isolated system 
collectively retreating to and staying in a small sub-space of the accessible phase space spontaneously, 
which, of course, is negated by the second law of thermodynamics.  
It is instructive to compare our theory of fairness in economic systems with the theories of John 
Rawls [42] and Robert Nozick [43] on equality, fairness and justice. Rawls arrives at his first principle 
of equality among people for basic liberties through the application of his ‗veil of ignorance‘ concept. 
This he views as a risk averse decision taken by a group of rational agents in the ‗original position‘. In 
our theory we arrive at the same result by applying the principle of maximum entropy. The ‗veil of 
ignorance‘, i.e., a veil of maximum uncertainty, is essentially the principle of maximum entropy. Since 
maximizing entropy is the same as maximizing fairness, Rawls‘ first principle of equality is derived as 
the maximally fair assignment and not as a risk averse outcome. Thus, the principle of equality emerges 
out of fairness, not out of fear, in our theory.  
Regarding Rawls‘ second principle, we first focus on the ‗difference principle‘ part, which is 
concerned with the distribution of wealth and income. In this, Rawls stipulates that a just society is one 
wherein the social and economic inequalities are to be arranged such that they are to be of the greatest 
benefit to the least-advantaged members of society, thereby preferring them more over the others. As 
Nozick and others have argued, this treats the more-advantaged members of the society in an unfair 
manner, thereby violating the equality principle. In our theory, by maximizing fairness all are treated 
equally, subject to the given constraints. Finally, Rawls‘ requirement that ―all positions and offices are 
open to all‖ is equivalent to the requirement that all parts of the accessible phase space are available to 
the agents equally in our theory.  
Thus, the application of maximum fairness principle results in consistent outcomes of equality and 
fairness in both cases. The Rawlsian framework is equivalent to our statistical teleodynamics theory in 
the economic context with the important difference that all conflicts are resolved using the maximum 
fairness principle. Further, the former is a subset of the latter as Rawls does not address constraints 
imposed by a market environment or the condition for attaining an equilibrium distribution.  
There are other key differences as well which show up in the economic inequality context. First of 
all, in both Rawlsian and Nozickian approaches, there is no quantification of the concepts of fairness, 
equality, or justice. They are treated in a qualitative manner. In our theory, we identify fairness as 
entropy which can be quantified and calculated for a given wage distribution. Secondly, in our theory 
we show how the maximally fair distribution can be determined given certain information or constraints. 
Since our theory makes testable predictions about what the maximally fair wage distribution ought to be 
in a free market environment, it can be used not only to verify the prediction but also to test whether the 
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free market is indeed behaving freely. Such analytical predictions are absent in the theories of Rawls and 
Nozick, making them harder to verify in real-life markets. Finally, our theory shows how these 
seemingly disparate systems of a large number of interacting entities, namely, thermodynamic, 
information, and economic systems (and perhaps even societal systems), are all governed by the same 
general concepts and principles in a unified analytic framework.  
Though our theory was inspired [37] by concepts from statistical thermodynamics and information 
theory, it is rather remarkable that the resultant statistical teleodynamic framework shares a close 
resemblance with the structure and elements of the theories of Rawls and Nozick. Indeed, the present 
author developed his theory unaware of the contributions of Rawls, Nozick, and others in political 
philosophy, until it was pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper. In the context of economics 
(and may be in the broader context of sociology as well, but this has not been developed here as it is not 
the objective of this paper), we believe that the statistical teleodynamic framework naturally combines 
the central ideas of Rawls and Nozick, with the exception that the difference principle favoring the weak 
is discarded. Instead, we have the principle of maximum fairness, i.e., the maximum entropy principle, 
which too can be seen as a ―difference principle‖ except that it treats every one fairly without favoring 
any particular group. This is the viewpoint advocated by Nozick. Thus, our theory naturally combines 
these two approaches even though its development was not motivated by this objective. 
Our analysis shows that a certain amount of seeming inequality of pay is inevitable in organizations. 
Given this reality, the lognormal distribution is the fairest inequality of pay. One may view our result as 
an ―economic law‖ in the statistical thermodynamics sense. The free market will ‗discover‘ and obey this 
economic law if allowed to function freely and efficiently without collusion like practices or other such 
unfair interferences. This result is the economic equivalent to the Boltzmann distribution of the energy 
landscape for ideal gases. In spirit, it‘s like the Boyle‘s law for ideal gases which ignores factors such as 
intermolecular forces, molecular size, etc., but nevertheless provides a useful basis for developing 
models for non-ideal systems. In a similar manner, our theory has its obvious limitations and does not 
take in to account industry or company specific factors, complexities of human interactions, competition 
and other market conditions, and so on. However, we present it with the hope of stimulating further 
research to examine its implications in greater depth and breadth for a wide variety of contexts in 
economics and social sciences.  
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